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and the human brain

  • 1 Brain

       Among the higher mammals the great development of neocortex occurs.
       In each group of mammals there is a steady increase in the area of the association cortex from the most primitive to the evolutionarily most recent type; there is an increase in the number of neurons and their connections. The degree of consciousness of an organism is some function of neuronal cell number and connectivity, perhaps of neurons of a particular type in association cortex regions. This function is of a threshold type such that there is a significant quantitative break with the emergence of humans. Although the importance of language and the argument that it is genetically specified and unique to humans must be reconsidered in the light of the recent evidence as to the possibility of teaching chimpanzees, if not to speak, then to manipulate symbolic words and phrases, there are a number of unique human features which combine to make the transition not merely quantitative, but also qualitative. In particular these include the social, productive nature of human existence, and the range and extent of the human capacity to communicate. These features have made human history not so much one of biological but of social evolution, of continuous cultural transformation. (Rose, 1976, pp. 180-181)
       [S]ome particular property of higher primate and cetacean brains did not evolve until recently. But what was that property? I can suggest at least four possibilities...: (1) Never before was there a brain so massive; (2) Never before was there a brain with so large a ratio of brain to body mass; (3) Never before was there a brain with certain functional units (large frontal and temporal lobes, for example); (4) Never before was there a brain with so many neural connections or synapses.... Explanations 1, 2 and 4 argue that a quantitative change produced a qualitative change. It does not seem to me that a crisp choice among these four alternatives can be made at the present time, and I suspect that the truth will actually embrace most or all of these possibilities. (Sagan, 1978, pp. 107-109)
       The crucial change in the human brain in this million years or so has not been so much the increase in size by a factor of three, but the concentration of that increase in three or four main areas. The visual area has increased considerably, and, compared with the chimpanzee, the actual density of human brain cells is at least 50 percent greater. A second increase has taken place in the area of manipulation of the hand, which is natural since we are much more hand-driven animals than monkeys and apes. Another main increase has taken place in the temporal lobe, in which visual memory, integration, and speech all lie fairly close together. And the fourth great increase has taken place in the frontal lobes. Their function is extremely difficult to understand... ; but it is clear that they're largely responsible for the ability to initiate a task, to be attentive while it is being done, and to persevere with it. (Bronowski, 1978, pp. 23-24)
       The human brain works however it works. Wishing for it to work in some way as a shortcut to justifying some ethical principle undermines both the science and the ethics (for what happens to the principle if the scientific facts turn out to go the other way?). (Pinker, 1994, p. 427)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Brain

  • 2 brain

    [breɪn]
    n

    We have a very minor understanding of how the brain works. — Мы очень мало разбираемся в том, как работает/функционирует мозг.

    People with more or less disordered brain. — Люди с расстроенной психикой/психически неуравновешенные люди.

    The power of thinking depends upon the brain. — Мыслительная сила зависит от головного мозга.

    - human brain
    - smb's muddled brain
    - brain exhaustion
    - disease of the brain
    - tumour on the brain
    - suffusion of blood on the brain
    - cause brain damage
    - brain demands relaxation from strain
    2) ум, разум, рассудок

    Use your brains! — Пошевели мозгами! /Подумай!

    Does he have enough brains to do that? — У него хватает ума, чтобы это сделать?

    He has no brains. — Он безмозглый дурак.

    He has a very capable business brain. — Он очень способный деловой человек. /У него хорошие способности к комерческим делам.

    - powerful brain
    - mature brain
    - immature brain
    - buzy brain
    - inquisitive brain
    - scheming brain
    - calculating brain
    - haunted brain
    - highly-strung brain
    - great criminal brain
    - brain worker
    - brain teaser
    - scientific brains of the country
    - man of brains
    - writer with brains
    - man of average brains
    - puzzle one's brains over the problem
    - have good brains
    - have a mathematical brain
    - call in the best brains
    - pick smb's brains
    - have plenty of brains
    - be the brains of the organization
    - flitter across one's brains
    - muddle smb's brain
    - envy smb's brain
    - rack one's brains for his name
    - overtax one's brains
    - turn smb's brain
    - turn smb's brains
    - blow one's brains out
    - blow smb's brains out
    - cram smb's brains with figures
    - weigh upon one's brain
    - have brains to understand it
    - have both brains and beauty
    - appeal to the brain, not to the feelings
    - grief has turned his brains
    3) (обыкновенно pl) мозги (пища)

    Lamb's brains is my favourite dish. — Телячьи мозги - мое любимое блюдо

    - calve's brains
    - brains with melted-butter sauce

    English-Russian combinatory dictionary > brain

  • 3 activity and genomic organization of human glucose transporter 9 (GLUT9), a novel member of the family of sugar-transport facilitators predominantly expressed in brain and leucocytes

    Общая лексика: активность и геномная организация переносчика глюкозы 9 (GLUT9) че

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > activity and genomic organization of human glucose transporter 9 (GLUT9), a novel member of the family of sugar-transport facilitators predominantly expressed in brain and leucocytes

  • 4 activity and genomic organization of human glucose transporter 9 , a novel member of the family of sugar-transport facilitators predominantly expressed in brain and leucocytes

    Общая лексика: (GLUT9) активность и геномная организация переносчика глюкозы 9 (GLUT9) че

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > activity and genomic organization of human glucose transporter 9 , a novel member of the family of sugar-transport facilitators predominantly expressed in brain and leucocytes

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     ■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.
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     ■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.
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     ■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.
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     ■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.
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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 6 Information

       Information is carried by physical entities, such as books or sound waves or brains, but it is not itself material. Information in a living system is a feature of the order and arrangement of its parts, which arrangement provides the signs that constitute a "code" or "language."... The organization of the brain can be considered as the written script of the programs of our lives. So the important feature of brains is not the material that they are made of but the information that they carry.
       What neuroscience can do is to translate the language in which the brain programs are written into ordinary language. Since these are the programs that produce the phenomena of human language we are not really escaping it. We are using the analogies of language and of writing to understand the entities that produce them. As so often in the past, man, having invented an artifact (in this case writing) to help him with his life (by carrying information), is now trying to describe himself in terms of his artifact. (Young, 1978, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Information

  • 7 Computer Metaphors

       Within the AI community there is a growing dissatisfaction concerning the adequacy of sequential models to simulate the cognitive processes....
       For an example of the dissimilarity between computers and nervous systems, consider that in conventional computers... each piece of data [is] located in its own special space in the memory bank [and] can be retrieved only by a central processor that knows the address in the memory bank for each datum. Human memory appears to be organized along entirely different lines. For one thing, from a partial or a degraded stimulus human memory can "reconstruct" the rest, and there are associative relationships among stored pieces of information based on considerations of context rather than on considerations of location.... t now appears doubtful that individual neurons are so specific that they are tuned to respond to a single item and nothing else. Thus, connectionist models tend to devise and use distributed principles, which means that elements may be selective to a range of stimuli and there are no "grandmother cells."...
       Information storage, it appears, is in some ill-defined sense a function of connectivity among sets of neurons. This implies that there is something fundamentally wrong in understanding the brain's memory on the model of individual symbols stored at unique addresses in a data bank....
       A further source of misgivings about the computer metaphor concerns real-time constraints. Although the signal velocities in nervous systems are quite slow in comparison to those in computers, brains are nonetheless far, far faster than electronic devices in the execution of their complex tasks. For example, human brains are incomparably faster than any computer in word-nonword recognition tasks. (P. S. Churchland, 1986, pp. 458-459)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computer Metaphors

  • 8 Asimov, Isaac

    (1920-1992) Азимов, Айзек
    Писатель, популяризатор науки. Родился в России, в трехлетнем возрасте эмигрировал в США с родителями. В 1941 получил степень магистра в Колумбийском университете, в 1948 степень доктора [ Ph.D.] там же. С 1949 был преподавателем, затем профессором биохимии Бостонского университета [ Boston University]. Еще студентом опубликовал первый научно-фантастический рассказ. В 1950 вышел первый сборник его научной фантастики "Гальки в небе" ["Pebbles in the Sky"], за которым последовали романы "Я, Робот" ["I, Robot"] (1950), "Звезды как пыль" ["The Stars Like Dust"] (1951), "Космические течения" ["The Currents of Space"] (1952), "Стальные пещеры" ["The Caves of Steel"] (1954), "Обнаженное солнце" ["The Naked Sun"] (1957), "На земле места хватает" ["Earth Is Room Enough"] (1957) и др. В 1951-53 вышла его трилогия "Фаундейшн" ["Foundation"], "Фаундейшн и Империя" ["Foundation and Empire"] и "Фаундейшн II" ["Second Foundation"], за которую он получил премию Хьюго [Hugo Award] - самую престижную премию в области научной фантастики. В своих романах поднимал проблемы не только безграничных возможностей науки, но и авторитаризма и демократии, рационализма, технократии и нравственности. Соавтор учебника по биохимии, вышедшего в Бостонском университете, автор многочисленных научно-популярных книг, в том числе таких как "Химия жизни" ["The Chemistry of Life"] (1954), "Кирпичики вселенной" ["The Building Blocks of the Universe"] (1957), "Мозг человека" ["The Human Brain"] (1964), "Азимов о физике" ["Asimov on Physics"] (1976), "Тринадцать преступлений научной фантастики" ["The Thirteen Crimes of Science Fiction"] (1979) и др.

    English-Russian dictionary of regional studies > Asimov, Isaac

  • 9 research

    rɪˈsə:tʃ
    1. сущ.
    1) часто мн. (научное) исследование;
    изучение;
    изыскание;
    исследовательская работа (in, into, on) to be engaged in research ≈ заниматься научно-исследовательской работой to conduct, do, pursue research ≈ проводить исследования to carry out a research into the causes of cancer ≈ исследовать причины заболевания раком His researches have been fruitful. ≈ Его исследования принесли результаты. research work ≈ (научно-) исследовательская работа research assistantship ≈ лаборантская субсидия research university ≈ исследовательский университет
    2) тщательные поиски (after, for)
    2. гл. исследовать;
    заниматься исследованиями Scientists have spent years researching into the effects of certain chemicals on the human brain. ≈ Ученые многие потратили на изучение влияния различных веществ на человеческий мозг. исследование, изучение, изыскание;
    научно-исследовательская работа - * workers исследователи;
    научно-исследовательские работники - * students аспиранты - * professor профессор, занимающийся только( научно-) исследовательской работой - * and development научно-исследовательские и опытно-конструкторские работы - space * исследование космического пространства - advanced * перспективные исследования - basic * фундаментальные исследования - to be engaged in * заниматься научно-исследовательской работой - to carry out a * into /for/ the causes of the disease исследовать причины заболевания - his *es have been successful его изыскания были успешны (after) тщательные поиски - * after oil поиски нефти - * after facts установление фактов /фактической стороны дела/ исследовать, заниматься исследованиями - to * a problem изучать проблему;
    устанавливать факты, относящиеся к какой-л. проблеме - to * into the causes of cancer исследовать причины раковых заболеваний - an important problem into which too few scientists have *ed важный вопрос, которым занимались лишь немногие исследователи собирать материал - to * for a book собирать материал для книги applied ~ прикладные исследования basic ~ фундаментальные исследования to be engaged in ~ заниматься научно-исследовательской работой;
    his researches have been fruitful его изыскания были плодотворными to carry out a ~ into the causes of cancer исследовать причины заболевания раком consumer ~ изучение потребителя contract ~ изучение условий контракта copy ~ анализ текста рекламного сообщения economic ~ экономические исследования to be engaged in ~ заниматься научно-исследовательской работой;
    his researches have been fruitful его изыскания были плодотворными marketing ~ анализ возможностей сбыта marketing ~ маркетинговые исследования media ~ изучение средств рекламы motivational ~ исследование мотиваций motivational ~ мотивационный анализ operational ~ операционный анализ operations ~ исследование операций participatory ~ метод исследования в котором взаимодействуют и помогают друг другу исследователи и те среди которых ведется данное исследование qualitative ~ качественный анализ quantitative ~ количественный анализ recall ~ анализ возврата продукции research заниматься научными исследованиями ~ изучение ~ изыскание ~ (часто pl) (научное) исследование;
    изучение;
    изыскание;
    исследовательская работа ~ (научное) исследование ~ исследование ~ исследовать, заниматься (научными) исследованиями ~ исследовать;
    заниматься исследованиями (into) ~ исследовать ~ научно-исследовательская работа ~ тщательные поиски (after, for) ~ attr. исследовательский;
    research work исследовательская работа, научно-исследовательская работа ~ attr. исследовательский;
    research work исследовательская работа, научно-исследовательская работа sector ~ отраслевые исследования social ~ социологические исследования sponsored ~ финансируемые научные исследования

    Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > research

  • 10 visual processing

    обработка графических, визуальных и/или видеоданных; визуальное восприятие
    к этой области относятся различные компьютерные технологии распознавания (опознавания).

    This information probably will be presented in graphical form, to exploit more fully the large fraction of the human brain devoted to visual processing and the visual system's pattern recognition ability. — Эта информация будет, по-видимому, представляться в графической форме, чтобы наиболее полно использовать большую часть человеческого мозга, отвечающую за визуальное восприятие, и возможности распознавания образов, присущие компьютерной системе визуализации (обработки визуальных данных) см. тж. graphical form, recognition, visual system

    Англо-русский толковый словарь терминов и сокращений по ВТ, Интернету и программированию. > visual processing

  • 11 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 12 Consciousness

       Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.
    ... Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. (T. Nagel, 1979, pp. 165-166)
       This approach to understanding sensory qualia is both theoretically and empirically motivated... [;] it suggests an effective means of expressing the allegedly inexpressible. The "ineffable" pink of one's current visual sensation may be richly and precisely expressed as a 95Hz/80Hz/80Hz "chord" in the relevant triune cortical system. The "unconveyable" taste sensation produced by the fabled Australian health tonic Vegamite might be poignantly conveyed as a 85/80/90/15 "chord" in one's four channeled gustatory system.... And the "indescribably" olfactory sensation produced by a newly opened rose might be quite accurately described as a 95/35/10/80/60/55 "chord" in some six-dimensional space within one's olfactory bulb. (P. M. Churchland, 1989, p. 106)
       One of philosophy's favorite facets of mentality has received scant attention from cognitive psychologists, and that is consciousness itself: fullblown, introspective, inner-world phenomenological consciousness. In fact if one looks in the obvious places... one finds not so much a lack of interest as a deliberate and adroit avoidance of the issue. I think I know why. Consciousness appears to be the last bastion of occult properties, epiphenomena, and immeasurable subjective states-in short, the one area of mind best left to the philosophers, who are welcome to it. Let them make fools of themselves trying to corral the quicksilver of "phenomenology" into a respectable theory. (Dennett, 1978b, p. 149)
       When I am thinking about anything, my consciousness consists of a number of ideas.... But every idea can be resolved into elements... and these elements are sensations. (Titchener, 1910, p. 33)
       A Darwin machine now provides a framework for thinking about thought, indeed one that may be a reasonable first approximation to the actual brain machinery underlying thought. An intracerebral Darwin Machine need not try out one sequence at a time against memory; it may be able to try out dozens, if not hundreds, simultaneously, shape up new generations in milliseconds, and thus initiate insightful actions without overt trial and error. This massively parallel selection among stochastic sequences is more analogous to the ways of darwinian biology than to the "von Neumann" serial computer. Which is why I call it a Darwin Machine instead; it shapes up thoughts in milliseconds rather than millennia, and uses innocuous remembered environments rather than noxious real-life ones. It may well create the uniquely human aspect of our consciousness. (Calvin, 1990, pp. 261-262)
       To suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual, momentary successive states may be, I give the name of our consciousness.... There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being to be added to the wolves, tygers, elephants, and other living creatures.... The fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling, which is said to be its object, has arisen, in a great measure, from the use of the personal pronoun I. (T. Brown, 1970, p. 336)
       The human capacity for speech is certainly unique. But the gulf between it and the behavior of animals no longer seems unbridgeable.... What does this leave us with, then, which is characteristically human?.... t resides in the human capacity for consciousness and self-consciousness. (Rose, 1976, p. 177)
       [Human consciousness] depends wholly on our seeing the outside world in such categories. And the problems of consciousness arise from putting reconstitution beside internalization, from our also being able to see ourselves as if we were objects in the outside world. That is in the very nature of language; it is impossible to have a symbolic system without it.... The Cartesian dualism between mind and body arises directly from this, and so do all the famous paradoxes, both in mathematics and in linguistics.... (Bronowski, 1978, pp. 38-39)
       It seems to me that there are at least four different viewpoints-or extremes of viewpoint-that one may reasonably hold on the matter [of computation and conscious thinking]:
       A. All thinking is computation; in particular, feelings of conscious awareness are evoked merely by the carrying out of appropriate computations.
       B. Awareness is a feature of the brain's physical action; and whereas any physical action can be simulated computationally, computational simulation cannot by itself evoke awareness.
       C. Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.
       D. Awareness cannot be explained by physical, computational, or any other scientific terms. (Penrose, 1994, p. 12)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Consciousness

  • 13 Mind

       It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)
       Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)
       The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)
       MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)
       [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)
       Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)
       7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses
       Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....
       Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.
       In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.
       The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)
       Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.
    ... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind

  • 14 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 15 Computers

       The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)
       It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....
       The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)
       The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)
       In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)
       A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.
       In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....
       It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)
       [Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)
       he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)
       t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.
       Further, the effects of those ideas are rapidly compounding, because a computer design is itself just a set of ideas. As we get better at manipulating ideas by building ever better computers, we get better at building even better computers-it's an ever-escalating upward spiral. The early nineteenth century, when the computer's story began, is already so far back that it may as well be the Stone Age. (Rawlins, 1997, p. 19)
       According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)
       What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
       What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.
       In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computers

  • 16 Berger, Hans

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 21 May 1873 Neuses bei Coburg, Germany
    d. 1 June 1941 Jena, Germany
    [br]
    German psychiatrist and neurophysiologist, discoverer of the human electroencephalogram (EEG).
    [br]
    Berger studied medicine at the University of Jena from 1892. In 1897 he became Assistant to the psychiatric clinic, in 1912 he became Chief Doctor and then Director and Professor of Psychiatry, remaining in this post until his retirement in 1938.
    The central theme of his research work was the correlation between the objective activity of the brain and subjective psychic phenomena. His early attempts involving the blood flow and temperature of the brain yielded no positive results, and it was not until 1929 that he had developed methods of recording the fluctuations of electric potential arising from brain activity. This electroencephalogram (EEG) proved to be of immediate value in the diagnosis and treatment of brain disease, but it did not prove to be an indicator of a connection between brain and psychic energy.
    Although Berger continued to study the EEC intensively, the technique did not gain widespread recognition until its development by Adrian and Matthews from 1934 onwards.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    Various papers, including "Über das Elektrenkephalogramm des Menschens", Archiv für Psychiatrie, 1929–38.
    Further Reading
    Adrian and Matthews, 1934, "The Berger Rhythm", Brain.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Berger, Hans

  • 17 head

    hed
    1. noun
    1) (the top part of the human body, containing the eyes, mouth, brain etc; the same part of an animal's body: The stone hit him on the head; He scratched his head in amazement.) cabeza
    2) (a person's mind: An idea came into my head last night.) cabeza, mente
    3) (the height or length of a head: The horse won by a head.) cabeza
    4) (the chief or most important person (of an organization, country etc): Kings and presidents are heads of state; (also adjective) a head waiter; the head office.) cabeza, jefe
    5) (anything that is like a head in shape or position: the head of a pin; The boy knocked the heads off the flowers.) cabeza
    6) (the place where a river, lake etc begins: the head of the Nile.) fuente, nacimiento
    7) (the top, or the top part, of anything: Write your address at the head of the paper; the head of the table.) cabecera, principio
    8) (the front part: He walked at the head of the procession.) a la cabeza de, al frente de
    9) (a particular ability or tolerance: He has no head for heights; She has a good head for figures.) madera; cabeza
    10) (a headmaster or headmistress: You'd better ask the Head.) director; directora
    11) ((for) one person: This dinner costs $10 a head.) por cabeza
    12) (a headland: Beachy Head.) cabo, punta
    13) (the foam on the top of a glass of beer etc.) espuma

    2. verb
    1) (to go at the front of or at the top of (something): The procession was headed by the band; Whose name headed the list?) encabezar
    2) (to be in charge of; to be the leader of: He heads a team of scientists investigating cancer.) encabezar, estar al frente de, dirigir
    3) ((often with for) to (cause to) move in a certain direction: The explorers headed south; The boys headed for home; You're heading for disaster!) dirigirse a, encaminarse hacia, ir rumbo a
    4) (to put or write something at the beginning of: His report was headed `Ways of Preventing Industrial Accidents'.) titular
    5) ((in football) to hit the ball with the head: He headed the ball into the goal.) cabecear, rematar con la cabeza
    •
    - - headed
    - header
    - heading
    - heads
    - headache
    - headband
    - head-dress
    - headfirst
    - headgear
    - headlamp
    - headland
    - headlight
    - headline
    - headlines
    - headlong
    - head louse
    - headmaster
    - head-on
    - headphones
    - headquarters
    - headrest
    - headscarf
    - headsquare
    - headstone
    - headstrong
    - headwind
    - above someone's head
    - go to someone's head
    - head off
    - head over heels
    - heads or tails?
    - keep one's head
    - lose one's head
    - make head or tail of
    - make headway
    - off one's head
    head1 n
    1. cabeza
    mind your head! ¡cuidado con la cabeza!
    2. cabecera
    3. jefe / director
    head2 vb
    1. encabezar / ir a la cabeza
    2. cabecear / dar de cabeza
    to head for... dirigirse a... / ir camino de...
    I'm heading for home me dirijo a casa / voy camino de casa
    tr[hed]
    1 (gen) cabeza; (mind) mente nombre femenino
    2 (on tape recorder, video) cabezal nombre masculino
    3 (of bed, table) cabecera
    4 (of page) principio
    5 (on beer) espuma
    6 (cape) cabo, punta
    7 (of school, company) director,-ra
    ■ four hundred head of cattle cuatrocientas reses, cuatrocientas cabezas de ganado
    9 (coin) cara
    10 (of cabbage, lettuce) cogollo; (of cauliflower) pella
    1 principal, jefe
    1 (company, list etc) encabezar
    2 (ball) rematar de cabeza, dar un cabezazo a, cabecear
    \
    SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALL
    from head to toe / from head to foot de pies a cabeza
    heads or tails? ¿cara o cruz?
    off the top of one's head sin pensárselo, así de entrada
    on your own head be it! ¡allá te las compongas!
    per head por barba, por cabeza
    ■ it cost us £12 per head nos costó doce libras por barba
    to be head over heels in love with somebody estar locamente enamorado,-a de alguien
    to be off one's head estar chiflado,-a
    to bite somebody's head off familiar echar una bronca a alguien
    to do something standing on one's head hacer algo con los ojos vendados
    to have a good head for figures tener facilidad para los números
    to have a head for heights no padecer vértigo
    to keep one's head above water mantenerse a flote
    to keep one's head mantener la calma
    to laugh one's head off reírse a carcajadas
    two heads are better than one cuatro ojos ven más que dos
    head teacher director,-ra
    head start ventaja
    head office oficina central
    head ['hɛd] vt
    1) lead: encabezar
    2) direct: dirigir
    head vi
    : dirigirse
    head adj
    main: principal
    the head office: la oficina central, la sede
    head n
    1) : cabeza f
    from head to foot: de pies a cabeza
    2) mind: mente f, cabeza f
    3) tip, top: cabeza f (de un clavo, un martillo, etc.), cabecera f (de una mesa o un río), punta f (de una flecha), flor m (de un repollo, etc.), encabezamiento m (de una carta, etc.), espuma f (de cerveza)
    4) director, leader: director m, -tora f; jefe m, -fa f; cabeza f (de una familia)
    5) : cara f (de una moneda)
    heads or tails: cara o cruz
    6) : cabeza f
    500 head of cattle: 500 cabezas de ganado
    $10 a head: $10 por cabeza
    7)
    to come to a head : llegar a un punto crítico
    adj.
    • primero, -a adj.
    • principal adj.
    n.
    • cabecera s.f.
    • cabeza s.f.
    • cabezuela s.f.
    • director s.m.
    • dirigente s.m.
    • encabezamiento s.m.
    • mayor s.m.
    • mollera s.f.
    • principal s.m.
    • testa s.f.
    head (s.o.) off (On the road, etc.)
    expr.
    • atajar v.
    • cortarle el paso expr.
    v.
    • cabecear v.
    • descabezar v.
    • dirigir v.
    • encabezar v.
    • mandar v.
    hed
    I
    1) ( Anat) cabeza f

    to stand on one's head — pararse de cabeza (AmL), hacer* el pino (Esp)

    from head to foot o toe — de pies a cabeza, de arriba (a) abajo

    he's a head taller than his brother — le lleva or le saca la cabeza a su hermano

    head over heels: she tripped and went head over heels down the steps tropezó y cayó rodando escaleras abajo; to be head over heels in love estar* locamente or perdidamente enamorado; heads up! (AmE colloq) ojo! (fam), cuidado!; on your/his (own) head be it la responsabilidad es tuya/suya; to bang one's head against a (brick) wall darse* (con) la cabeza contra la pared; to be able to do something standing on one's head poder* hacer algo con los ojos cerrados; to bite o snap somebody's head off echarle una bronca a alguien (fam); to bury one's head in the sand hacer* como el avestruz; to get one's head down (colloq) ( work hard) ponerse* a trabajar en serio; ( settle for sleep) (BrE) irse* a dormir; to go over somebody's head ( bypassing hierarchy) pasar por encima de alguien; ( exceeding comprehension): his lecture went straight over my head no entendí nada de su conferencia; to go to somebody's head subírsele a la cabeza a alguien; to have a big o swelled o (BrE) swollen head ser* un creído; he's getting a swelled o (BrE) swollen head se le están subiendo los humos a la cabeza; to have one's head in the clouds tener* la cabeza llena de pájaros; to hold one's head up o high o up high ir* con la cabeza bien alta; to keep one's head above water mantenerse* a flote; to keep one's head down ( avoid attention) mantenerse* al margen; ( work hard) no levantar la cabeza; (lit: keep head lowered) no levantar la cabeza; to knock something on the head (colloq) dar* al traste con algo; to laugh one's head off reírse* a mandíbula batiente, desternillarse de (la) risa; to scream/shout one's head off gritar a voz en cuello; to make head or tail o (AmE also) heads or tails of something entender* algo; I can't make head or tail of it para mí esto no tiene ni pies ni cabeza; to rear one's ugly head: racism/fascism reared its ugly head again volvió a aparecer el fantasma del racismo/fascismo; to stand/be head and shoulders above somebody ( be superior) darle* cien vueltas a alguien, estar* muy por encima de alguien; to stand o turn something on its head darle* la vuelta a algo, poner* algo patas arriba (fam), dar* vuelta algo (CS); to turn somebody's head: the sort of good looks that turn heads el tipo de belleza que llama la atención or que hace que la gente se vuelva a mirar; (before n) head injury — lesión f en la cabeza

    2) (mind, brain) cabeza f

    he needs his head examined — está or anda mal de la cabeza

    she has a good head for business/figures — tiene cabeza para los negocios/los números

    use your head! — usa la cabeza!, piensa un poco!

    if we put our heads together, we'll be able to think of something — si lo pensamos juntos, algo se nos ocurrirá

    it never entered my head that... — ni se me pasó por la cabeza or jamás pensé que...

    to get something into somebody's head — meterle* algo en la cabeza a alguien

    to be off one's head — (colloq) estar* chiflado (fam), estar* or andar* mal de la cabeza

    to be out of one's head — (sl) ( on drugs) estar* flipado or volado or (Col) volando or (Méx) hasta atrás (arg); ( drunk) estar* como una cuba (fam)

    to be soft o weak in the head — estar* mal de la cabeza

    to get one's head (a)round something: I can't get my head (a)round this new system no me entra este nuevo sistema; to have one's head screwed on (right o the right way) (colloq) tener* la cabeza bien puesta or sentada; to keep/lose one's head mantener*/perder* la calma; two heads are better than one — cuatro ojos ven más que dos

    3)
    a) ( of celery) cabeza f; (of nail, tack, pin) cabeza f; (of spear, arrow) punta f; ( of hammer) cabeza f, cotillo m; ( of pimple) punta f, cabeza f; ( on beer) espuma f; ( of river) cabecera f
    b) (top end - of bed, table) cabecera f; (- of page, letter) encabezamiento m; (- of procession, line) cabeza f
    4)
    a) ( chief) director, -tora m,f

    head of state/government — jefe, -fa m,f de Estado/de Gobierno

    the head of the household — el/la cabeza de familia; (before n)

    head buyer — jefe, -fa m,f de compras

    head girl/boy — (BrE Educ) alumno elegido para representar al alumnado de un colegio

    head waiter — maître m, capitán m de meseros (Méx)

    b) ( head teacher) (esp BrE) director, -tora m,f (de colegio)
    5)
    a) ( person)

    $15 per head — 15 dólares por cabeza or persona

    b) pl head ( Agr)
    6) ( crisis)

    to come to a head — hacer* crisis, llegar* a un punto crítico

    7)
    a) ( magnetic device) (Audio, Comput) cabeza f, cabezal m
    b) ( of drill) cabezal m
    c) ( cylinder head) culata f
    8) ( Geog) cabo m

    II
    1.
    1)
    a) \<\<march/procession\>\> encabezar*, ir* a la cabeza de; \<\<list\>\> encabezar*
    b) \<\<revolt\>\> acaudillar, ser* el cabecilla de; \<\<team\>\> capitanear; \<\<expedition/department\>\> dirigir*, estar* al frente de
    2) ( direct) (+ adv compl) \<\<vehicle/ship\>\> dirigir*

    which way are you headed? — ¿hacia or para dónde vas?

    3) ( in soccer) \<\<ball\>\> cabecear
    4) \<\<page/chapter\>\> encabezar*

    2.
    vi

    where are you heading? — ¿hacia or para dónde vas?

    Phrasal Verbs:
    [hed]
    1. N
    1) (=part of body) cabeza f

    • my head aches — me duele la cabeza

    • the horse won by a (short) head — el caballo ganó por una cabeza (escasa)

    • he went head first into the ditch/wall — se cayó de cabeza en la zanja/se dio de cabeza contra la pared

    • from head to foot — de pies a cabeza

    • to give a horse its head — soltar las riendas a un caballo

    to give sb his/her head — dar rienda suelta a algn

    • wine goes to my head — el vino se me sube a la cabeza

    • head of hair — cabellera f

    • to go head over heels — caer de cabeza

    • to keep one's head down — (lit) no levantar la cabeza; (=work hard) trabajar de lo lindo; (=avoid being noticed) intentar pasar desapercibido

    • to nod one's head — decir que sí or asentir con la cabeza

    • to shake one's head — decir que no or negar con la cabeza

    • he stands head and shoulders above the rest — (lit) les saca más de una cabeza a los demás; (fig) los demás no le llegan a la suela del zapato

    • to stand on one's head — hacer el pino

    • she is a head taller than her sister — le saca una cabeza a su hermana

    • from head to toe — de pies a cabeza

    • I ought to bang or knock your heads together — os voy a dar un coscorrón a los dos *

    • he turned his head and looked back at her — volvió la cabeza y la miró

    - have one's head up one's arse or ass
    - bite sb's head off
    - put or lay one's head on the block
    - get one's head down

    to go over sb's head —

    - hold one's head up high
    - laugh one's head off
    - stand or turn sth on its head
    - want sb's head on a plate
    - turn one's head the other way
    - bury or hide or stick one's head in the sand
    - scream/shout one's head off

    I can't make head nor or or tail of what he's saying — no entiendo nada de lo que dice

    - turn heads
    - keep one's head above water
    acid 3., cloud 1., hang 1., 1), knock, price 1., 1), rear, swell 3., 1), top I, 1., 11)
    2) (=intellect, mind) cabeza f

    use your head! — ¡usa la cabeza!

    it's gone right out of my head — se me ha ido de la cabeza, se me ha olvidado

    • it was above their heads — no lo entendían

    • it's better to come to it with a clear head in the morning — es mejor hacerlo por la mañana con la cabeza despejada

    • it never entered my head — ni se me pasó por la cabeza siquiera

    • you need your head examining or examined — tú estás mal de la cabeza

    • to have a head for business/figures — ser bueno para los negocios/con los números

    • I have no head for heights — tengo vértigo

    • to do a sum in one's head — hacer un cálculo mental

    • he has got it into his head that... — se le ha metido en la cabeza que...

    I wish he would get it into his thick head that... — ya me gustaría que le entrara en ese cabezón que tiene que...

    who put that (idea) into your head? — ¿quién te ha metido eso en la cabeza?

    • I can't get that tune out of my head — no puedo quitarme esa música de la cabeza

    • it was over their heads — no lo entendían

    • I'm sure if we put our heads together we can work something out — estoy seguro de que si intercambiamos ideas encontraremos una solución

    • to take it into one's head to do sth, he took it into his head to go to Australia — se le metió en la cabeza ir a Australia

    • don't worry your head about it — no te preocupes, no le des muchas vueltas

    - keep one's head
    - lose one's head
    - be/go off one's head

    you must be off your head! — ¡estás como una cabra!

    - be out of one's head
    - he's got his head screwed on
    - be soft or weak in the head
    - go soft in the head
    3) (=leader) [of firm] director(a) m / f; (esp Brit) [of school] director(a) m / f

    • head of department — (in school, firm) jefe(-a) m / f de departamento

    head of French — el jefe/la jefa del departamento de francés

    • head of (the) household — cabeza mf de familia

    • head of state — (Pol) jefe(-a) m / f de Estado

    4) (=top part) [of hammer, pin, spot] cabeza f; [of arrow, spear] punta f; [of stick, cane] puño m; [of bed, page] cabecera f; [of stairs] parte f alta; (on beer) espuma f; [of river] cabecera f, nacimiento m; [of valley] final m; [of mountain pass] cima f

    at the head of — [+ organization] a la cabeza de; [+ train] en la parte delantera de

    to sit at the head of the table — sentarse en la cabecera de la mesa, presidir la mesa

    5) (Bot) [of flower] cabeza f, flor f; [of corn] mazorca f

    • a head of celery/ garlic — una cabeza de apio/ajo

    • a head of lettuce — una lechuga

    6) (Tech) (on tape-recorder) cabezal m, cabeza f magnética; [of cylinder] culata f; (Comput) cabeza f

    reading/writing head — cabeza f de lectura/grabación

    7) (=culmination)

    • this will bring matters to a head — esto llevará las cosas a un punto crítico

    • to come to a head — [situation] alcanzar un punto crítico

    8) heads (on coin) cara f

    heads or tails? — ¿cara o cruz?, ¿águila o sol? (Mex)

    9) (no pl) (=unit)

    £15 a or per head — 15 libras por cabeza or persona

    10) (Naut) proa f

    head to wind — con la proa a barlovento or de cara al viento

    11) (Geog) cabo m
    12) (=pressure)

    head of steam — presión f de vapor

    head of water — presión f de agua

    13) (=height) [of water]
    14) (=title) titular m; (=subject heading) encabezamiento m

    this comes under the head of... — esto viene en el apartado de...

    2. VT
    1) (=be at front of) [+ procession, league, poll] encabezar, ir a la cabeza de; [+ list] encabezar
    2) (=be in charge of) [+ organization] dirigir; (Sport) [+ team] capitanear
    3) (=steer) [+ ship, car, plane] dirigir
    4) (Ftbl) [+ goal] cabecear
    5) [+ chapter] encabezar
    3.
    VI

    where are you heading or headed? — ¿hacia dónde vas?, ¿para dónde vas?

    he hitched a ride on a truck heading or headed west — hizo autostop y lo recogió un camión que iba hacia el oeste

    they were heading home/back to town — volvían a casa/a la ciudad

    4.
    CPD

    head boy N — (Brit) (Scol) ≈ delegado m de la escuela (alumno)

    head buyer N — jefe(-a) m / f de compras

    head case * N — (Brit) majara * mf, chiflado(-a) * m / f

    head cheese N — (US) queso m de cerdo, cabeza f de jabalí (Sp), carne f en gelatina

    head chef N — chef mf, jefe(-a) m / f de cocina

    head coach N — (Sport) primer(a) entrenador(a) m / f

    head cold N — resfriado m (de cabeza)

    head count N — recuento m de personas

    head gardener N — jefe(-a) m / f de jardineros

    head girl N — (Brit) (Scol) ≈ delegada f de la escuela (alumna)

    head height N — altura f de la cabeza

    • at head height — a la altura de la cabeza

    head injury N — herida f en la cabeza

    head massage N — masaje m en la cabeza

    • to give sb a head massage — masajearle la cabeza a algn, darle un masaje en la cabeza a algn

    head nurse N — enfermero(-a) m / f jefe

    head office N — sede f central

    head prefect N — (Brit) (Scol) ≈ delegado(-a) m / f de la escuela (alumno/alumna)

    head restraint N — (Aut) apoyacabezas m inv, reposacabezas m inv

    to have a head start (over or on sb) — (Sport, fig) tener ventaja (sobre algn)

    he has a head start over other candidates — tiene ventaja sobre or les lleva ventaja a otros candidatos

    head wound N — herida f en la cabeza

    * * *
    [hed]
    I
    1) ( Anat) cabeza f

    to stand on one's head — pararse de cabeza (AmL), hacer* el pino (Esp)

    from head to foot o toe — de pies a cabeza, de arriba (a) abajo

    he's a head taller than his brother — le lleva or le saca la cabeza a su hermano

    head over heels: she tripped and went head over heels down the steps tropezó y cayó rodando escaleras abajo; to be head over heels in love estar* locamente or perdidamente enamorado; heads up! (AmE colloq) ojo! (fam), cuidado!; on your/his (own) head be it la responsabilidad es tuya/suya; to bang one's head against a (brick) wall darse* (con) la cabeza contra la pared; to be able to do something standing on one's head poder* hacer algo con los ojos cerrados; to bite o snap somebody's head off echarle una bronca a alguien (fam); to bury one's head in the sand hacer* como el avestruz; to get one's head down (colloq) ( work hard) ponerse* a trabajar en serio; ( settle for sleep) (BrE) irse* a dormir; to go over somebody's head ( bypassing hierarchy) pasar por encima de alguien; ( exceeding comprehension): his lecture went straight over my head no entendí nada de su conferencia; to go to somebody's head subírsele a la cabeza a alguien; to have a big o swelled o (BrE) swollen head ser* un creído; he's getting a swelled o (BrE) swollen head se le están subiendo los humos a la cabeza; to have one's head in the clouds tener* la cabeza llena de pájaros; to hold one's head up o high o up high ir* con la cabeza bien alta; to keep one's head above water mantenerse* a flote; to keep one's head down ( avoid attention) mantenerse* al margen; ( work hard) no levantar la cabeza; (lit: keep head lowered) no levantar la cabeza; to knock something on the head (colloq) dar* al traste con algo; to laugh one's head off reírse* a mandíbula batiente, desternillarse de (la) risa; to scream/shout one's head off gritar a voz en cuello; to make head or tail o (AmE also) heads or tails of something entender* algo; I can't make head or tail of it para mí esto no tiene ni pies ni cabeza; to rear one's ugly head: racism/fascism reared its ugly head again volvió a aparecer el fantasma del racismo/fascismo; to stand/be head and shoulders above somebody ( be superior) darle* cien vueltas a alguien, estar* muy por encima de alguien; to stand o turn something on its head darle* la vuelta a algo, poner* algo patas arriba (fam), dar* vuelta algo (CS); to turn somebody's head: the sort of good looks that turn heads el tipo de belleza que llama la atención or que hace que la gente se vuelva a mirar; (before n) head injury — lesión f en la cabeza

    2) (mind, brain) cabeza f

    he needs his head examined — está or anda mal de la cabeza

    she has a good head for business/figures — tiene cabeza para los negocios/los números

    use your head! — usa la cabeza!, piensa un poco!

    if we put our heads together, we'll be able to think of something — si lo pensamos juntos, algo se nos ocurrirá

    it never entered my head that... — ni se me pasó por la cabeza or jamás pensé que...

    to get something into somebody's head — meterle* algo en la cabeza a alguien

    to be off one's head — (colloq) estar* chiflado (fam), estar* or andar* mal de la cabeza

    to be out of one's head — (sl) ( on drugs) estar* flipado or volado or (Col) volando or (Méx) hasta atrás (arg); ( drunk) estar* como una cuba (fam)

    to be soft o weak in the head — estar* mal de la cabeza

    to get one's head (a)round something: I can't get my head (a)round this new system no me entra este nuevo sistema; to have one's head screwed on (right o the right way) (colloq) tener* la cabeza bien puesta or sentada; to keep/lose one's head mantener*/perder* la calma; two heads are better than one — cuatro ojos ven más que dos

    3)
    a) ( of celery) cabeza f; (of nail, tack, pin) cabeza f; (of spear, arrow) punta f; ( of hammer) cabeza f, cotillo m; ( of pimple) punta f, cabeza f; ( on beer) espuma f; ( of river) cabecera f
    b) (top end - of bed, table) cabecera f; (- of page, letter) encabezamiento m; (- of procession, line) cabeza f
    4)
    a) ( chief) director, -tora m,f

    head of state/government — jefe, -fa m,f de Estado/de Gobierno

    the head of the household — el/la cabeza de familia; (before n)

    head buyer — jefe, -fa m,f de compras

    head girl/boy — (BrE Educ) alumno elegido para representar al alumnado de un colegio

    head waiter — maître m, capitán m de meseros (Méx)

    b) ( head teacher) (esp BrE) director, -tora m,f (de colegio)
    5)
    a) ( person)

    $15 per head — 15 dólares por cabeza or persona

    b) pl head ( Agr)
    6) ( crisis)

    to come to a head — hacer* crisis, llegar* a un punto crítico

    7)
    a) ( magnetic device) (Audio, Comput) cabeza f, cabezal m
    b) ( of drill) cabezal m
    c) ( cylinder head) culata f
    8) ( Geog) cabo m

    II
    1.
    1)
    a) \<\<march/procession\>\> encabezar*, ir* a la cabeza de; \<\<list\>\> encabezar*
    b) \<\<revolt\>\> acaudillar, ser* el cabecilla de; \<\<team\>\> capitanear; \<\<expedition/department\>\> dirigir*, estar* al frente de
    2) ( direct) (+ adv compl) \<\<vehicle/ship\>\> dirigir*

    which way are you headed? — ¿hacia or para dónde vas?

    3) ( in soccer) \<\<ball\>\> cabecear
    4) \<\<page/chapter\>\> encabezar*

    2.
    vi

    where are you heading? — ¿hacia or para dónde vas?

    Phrasal Verbs:

    English-spanish dictionary > head

  • 18 Cognitive Psychology

       The basic reason for studying cognitive processes has become as clear as the reason for studying anything else: because they are there. Our knowledge of the world must be somehow developed from stimulus input.... Cognitive processes surely exist, so it can hardly be unscientific to study them. (Neisser, 1967, p. 5).
       The task of the cognitive psychologist is a highly inferential one. The cognitive psychologist must proceed from observations of the behavior of humans performing intellectual tasks to conclusions about the abstract mechanisms underlying the behavior. Developing a theory in cognitive psychology is much like developing a model for the working of the engine of a strange new vehicle by driving the vehicle, being unable to open it up to inspect the engine itself....
       It is well understood from the automata theory... that many different mechanisms can generate the same external behavior. (Anderson, 1980, pp. 12, 17)
       [Cognitive psychology does not] deal with whole people but with a very special and bizarre-almost Frankensteinian-preparation, which consists of a brain attached to two eyes, two ears, and two index fingers. This preparation is only to be found inside small, gloomy cubicles, outside which red lights burn to warn ordinary people away.... It does not feel hungry or tired or inquisitive; it does not think extraneous thoughts or try to understand what is going on. It is, in short, a computer, made in the image of the larger electronic organism that sends it stimuli and records its responses. (Claxton, 1980, p. 13)
       4) Cognitive Psychology Has Not Succeeded in Making a Significant Contribution to the Understanding of the Human Mind
       Cognitive psychology is not getting anywhere; that in spite of our sophisticated methodology, we have not succeeded in making a substantial contribution toward the understanding of the human mind.... A short time ago, the information processing approach to cognition was just beginning. Hopes were high that the analysis of information processing into a series of discrete stages would offer profound insights into human cognition. But in only a few short years the vigor of this approach was spent. It was only natural that hopes that had been so high should sink low. (Glass, Holyoak & Santa, 1979, p. ix)
       Cognitive psychology attempts to understand the nature of human intelligence and how people think. (Anderson, 1980, p. 3)
       The past few years have witnessed a noticeable increase in interest in an investigation of the cognitive processes.... It has resulted from a recognition of the complex processes that mediate between the classical "stimuli" and "responses" out of which stimulus-response learning theories hoped to fashion a psychology that would by-pass anything smacking of the "mental." The impeccable peripheralism of such theories could not last. One might do well to have a closer look at these intervening "cognitive maps." (Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956, p. vii)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Psychology

  • 19 head

    [hed] 1. noun
    1) (the top part of the human body, containing the eyes, mouth, brain etc; the same part of an animal's body: The stone hit him on the head; He scratched his head in amazement.) hoved
    2) (a person's mind: An idea came into my head last night.) hoved
    3) (the height or length of a head: The horse won by a head.) hovedlængde
    4) (the chief or most important person (of an organization, country etc): Kings and presidents are heads of state; ( also adjective) a head waiter; the head office.) chef; overhoved; over-; hoved-
    5) (anything that is like a head in shape or position: the head of a pin; The boy knocked the heads off the flowers.) hoved
    6) (the place where a river, lake etc begins: the head of the Nile.) udspring
    7) (the top, or the top part, of anything: Write your address at the head of the paper; the head of the table.) det øverste af noget; top; ende
    8) (the front part: He walked at the head of the procession.) spids
    9) (a particular ability or tolerance: He has no head for heights; She has a good head for figures.) hoved
    10) (a headmaster or headmistress: You'd better ask the Head.) skoleinspektør; rektor; forstander
    11) ((for) one person: This dinner costs $10 a head.) per hoved
    12) (a headland: Beachy Head.) forbjerg
    13) (the foam on the top of a glass of beer etc.) skum
    2. verb
    1) (to go at the front of or at the top of (something): The procession was headed by the band; Whose name headed the list?) lede; stå øverst
    2) (to be in charge of; to be the leader of: He heads a team of scientists investigating cancer.) lede; stå i spidsen for
    3) ((often with for) to (cause to) move in a certain direction: The explorers headed south; The boys headed for home; You're heading for disaster!) styre
    4) (to put or write something at the beginning of: His report was headed `Ways of Preventing Industrial Accidents'.) give som overskrift
    5) ((in football) to hit the ball with the head: He headed the ball into the goal.) heade
    •
    - - headed
    - header
    - heading
    - heads
    - headache
    - headband
    - head-dress
    - headfirst
    - headgear
    - headlamp
    - headland
    - headlight
    - headline
    - headlines
    - headlong
    - head louse
    - headmaster
    - head-on
    - headphones
    - headquarters
    - headrest
    - headscarf
    - headsquare
    - headstone
    - headstrong
    - headwind
    - above someone's head
    - go to someone's head
    - head off
    - head over heels
    - heads or tails?
    - keep one's head
    - lose one's head
    - make head or tail of
    - make headway
    - off one's head
    * * *
    [hed] 1. noun
    1) (the top part of the human body, containing the eyes, mouth, brain etc; the same part of an animal's body: The stone hit him on the head; He scratched his head in amazement.) hoved
    2) (a person's mind: An idea came into my head last night.) hoved
    3) (the height or length of a head: The horse won by a head.) hovedlængde
    4) (the chief or most important person (of an organization, country etc): Kings and presidents are heads of state; ( also adjective) a head waiter; the head office.) chef; overhoved; over-; hoved-
    5) (anything that is like a head in shape or position: the head of a pin; The boy knocked the heads off the flowers.) hoved
    6) (the place where a river, lake etc begins: the head of the Nile.) udspring
    7) (the top, or the top part, of anything: Write your address at the head of the paper; the head of the table.) det øverste af noget; top; ende
    8) (the front part: He walked at the head of the procession.) spids
    9) (a particular ability or tolerance: He has no head for heights; She has a good head for figures.) hoved
    10) (a headmaster or headmistress: You'd better ask the Head.) skoleinspektør; rektor; forstander
    11) ((for) one person: This dinner costs $10 a head.) per hoved
    12) (a headland: Beachy Head.) forbjerg
    13) (the foam on the top of a glass of beer etc.) skum
    2. verb
    1) (to go at the front of or at the top of (something): The procession was headed by the band; Whose name headed the list?) lede; stå øverst
    2) (to be in charge of; to be the leader of: He heads a team of scientists investigating cancer.) lede; stå i spidsen for
    3) ((often with for) to (cause to) move in a certain direction: The explorers headed south; The boys headed for home; You're heading for disaster!) styre
    4) (to put or write something at the beginning of: His report was headed `Ways of Preventing Industrial Accidents'.) give som overskrift
    5) ((in football) to hit the ball with the head: He headed the ball into the goal.) heade
    •
    - - headed
    - header
    - heading
    - heads
    - headache
    - headband
    - head-dress
    - headfirst
    - headgear
    - headlamp
    - headland
    - headlight
    - headline
    - headlines
    - headlong
    - head louse
    - headmaster
    - head-on
    - headphones
    - headquarters
    - headrest
    - headscarf
    - headsquare
    - headstone
    - headstrong
    - headwind
    - above someone's head
    - go to someone's head
    - head off
    - head over heels
    - heads or tails?
    - keep one's head
    - lose one's head
    - make head or tail of
    - make headway
    - off one's head

    English-Danish dictionary > head

  • 20 rogue

    •• rogue, rogue state

    •• Rogue 1. a criminally dishonest person. 2. a playfully mischievous person (The Random House Dictionary).
    •• Даже самые современные словари ограничиваются в описании этого слова такими значениями, как жулик, мошенник, негодяй, проказник, плюс несколько технических значений. Приводится также словосочетание rogue elephant (слон-отшельник), а также довольно известный полицейский термин rogue’s gallery (архив фотографий преступников). А теперь несколько примеров актуального употребления этого слова. Газета International Herald Tribune цитирует высказывание премьер-министра Малайзии: We still believe there are sincere investors out there. But there are still quite a few rogues who can cause an avalanche forcing others to run for cover. Американские дипломаты нередко называют такие страны, как Ливия, Ирак, Иран, rogue states. Думаю, что ни в первом, ни особенно во втором случае слова мошенник или негодяй не подойдут. Тем более в следующем примере из статьи бывшего прокурора Трибунала ООН по военным преступлениям: The likelihood that a rogue prosecutor would be appointed, let alone the idea that a diverse panel of independent judges would permit the indictment of anyone for political motives, is negligible. Что такое rogue prosecutor? В статье вполне достаточно подсказок. США, пишет автор, опасаются, что its soldiers might one day face frivolous prosecutions by the permanent international court (т.е. что американские военнослужащие будут подвергнуты необоснованному судебному преследованию). Но, пишет он далее, the careful procedures and demanding qualification for the selection of the prosecutor and judges... serve as an effective check against irresponsible behavior. Именно в слове irresponsible и содержится разгадка. Итак, a rogue prosecutor это безответственный прокурор (способный без достаточных оснований возбудить судебное дело). Соответственно a rogue state – «безответственное» государство, государство, не признающее международных норм, государство-изгой. Я встречал также в русских текстах словосочетание экстремистские государства. А в высказывании премьер-министра Малайзии rogues скорее все-таки безответственные лица, чем негодяи или мошенники.
    •• * Когда перевод закрепился в прессе, изменить существующую практику фактически невозможно. Едва ли не все предлагавшиеся варианты соответствий rogue states – экстремистские/ безответственные/ опасные и даже опальные государства – лучше, чем государства-изгои, но ничего уже не поделаешь (в разговоре с французскими коллегами в ООН выяснилось, что им закрепившийся в печати перевод états-voyous тоже не нравится). Но, конечно, слово rogue употребляется не только в этом сочетании. Оно высокочастотно и имеет множество оттенков значений. В этом можно убедиться, заглянув в словари, но и они не передают всего богатства возможных вариантов перевода.
    •• Вот цитата из New York Times:
    •• At a critical turn in the crisis over the sexual abuse of children by rogue priests, the nation’s Roman Catholic bishops tried to show their commitment to reform last year by naming a review board of prominent laypeople led by former Gov. Frank Keating of Oklahoma.
    •• Можно говорить о значении, примерно описываемом так: дискредитировавший себя, запятнавший свою репутацию неподобающим поведением и т.п. Вообще элемент безответственности, незаконности, неправильного поведения – общий в словосочетаниях rogue state и rogue priest. В более широком смысле общим является элемент опасности: rogue elephants опасны для жителей соседних деревень, rogue priests – для семей верующих и для общества в целом, rogue states – для международного сообщества. В приведенной выше фразе возможен, конечно, контекстуальный перевод, основанный на знании ситуации (священники, виновные в развращении несовершеннолетних).
    •• В статье Энн Эплбаум в New York Review of Books читаем:
    •• A few years ago, a series of bombs went off around Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. President Putin blamed the Chechens <...> Others blamed “ rogue elements” in the Russian security services, and even offered evidence.
    •• Здесь rogue elements можно, по-моему, перевести и как преступные элементы, и даже как темные силы, но точнее всего – вышедшие из-под контроля сотрудники спецслужб. Элемент вышедший из-под контроля имплицитно присутствует и в rogue elephant, и в какой-то мере в rogue state. Но вообще-то это довольно близко к пресловутым оборотням в погонах. Конечно, нередко встречающийся в англоязычной печати «перевод» werewolves wearing police epaulets крайне неудачен. Сказочно-мифический персонаж здесь совсем неуместен, да и «погоны» не надо понимать буквально. Police/ security service turncoats (или просто turncoats) вполне приемлемо.
    •• Несмотря на установленное «самой жизнью» соответствие rogue policemen или police turncoats и «оборотней в погонах», американские корреспонденты в Москве продолжают настаивать на werewolves. David Filipow (Boston Globe) – he should know better! – пишет:
    •• Russians call them “ werewolves in uniform” - police officers who abuse their power to extort and rob the citizens they are supposed to safeguard.
    •• Конечно, журналистам хочется добавить немного местного колорита, отсюда Russians call them (что тоже в общем неверно: выражение запущено в оборот бывшим министром Грызловым, оно неприятно напоминает «убийц в белых халатах» и в речи обычных Russians встречается редко).
    •• Вообще, надо сказать, атрибутивное rogue – богатейшее слово, причем, как выясняется, англичане любят его не меньше, чем американцы.
    •• Все следующие примеры с сайта www.bbc.co.uk:
    •• Researchers may have uncovered why the « rogue» prion protein which causes BSE and CJD is such an efficient destroyer of brain cells. Scientists at two US research centres have discovered that the presence of the protein in one particular part of the brain cell is enough to poison it. CJD is the best-known type of disease thought to be caused by “ rogue” prions. These are “ misshapen” versions of a normal cell protein, which stop behaving in the normal way and cannot be disposed of by the cell.
    •• Rogue white blood cells may hold the secret to how and why some life-threatening diseases develop, US scientists believe.
    •• It could lead to rogue GM crop plants that are harder to control, warns the government agency, which champions wildlife conservation in Britain.
    •• Scientists have discovered that a rogue wave pattern helped cause one of the UK’s biggest maritime disasters.
    •• The United Nations has warned that about 30% of pesticides marketed in the developing world contain toxic substances which pose a serious threat to human health and the environment. The rogue pesticides contained chemicals either banned or severely restricted elsewhere in the world, or concentrations of chemicals which exceeded international limits.
    •• A space mission to knock a potential rogue asteroid off course is undergoing feasibility studies with money from the European Space Agency.
    •• Investigators suspect that a rogue scientist may have obtained access to samples of the bacteria.
    •• В первых нескольких примерах стержневым для переводчика смысловым элементом является аномальность (клеток крови, белка, генетически модифицированных растений, волн). В случае с астероидом подойдет перевод опасный. Rogue scientist – что-то вроде «преступника в белом халате». А может быть, ученый-оборотень? Языковая мода – оружие огромной силы.
    •• Еще примеры. Из статьи Энн Коултер (эта дама – «правее всех правых»):
    •• Liberals waged a vicious campaign of vilification against Bork, saying he would bring back segregated lunch counters, government censorship and “rogue police” engaging in midnight raids.
    •• Здесь rogue police, конечно, не оборотни в погонах, а скорее полиция, сорвавшаяся с тормозов. А может быть – в этом контексте – просто обнаглевшие полисмены.
    •• С сайта BBC:
    •• According to CNN political analyst Bill Schneider, the American people, by 2-to-1, think that he [Rumsfeld] should be allowed to stay on the job. It is not because they are not outraged and disgusted by the prisoner abuse scandal but because they believe that these were “rogue acts of criminality.”
    •• В данном случае, пожалуй, лучше всего просто преступный произвол. Но можно перевести (слегка «русифицируя») и как преступные действия горстки отщепенцев.
    •• Из «Известий»:
    •• Главный врач столичной скорой помощи рассказал «Известиям» об «оборотнях» в белых халатах.
    •• Напрашивается: rogue doctors/first aid workers.

    English-Russian nonsystematic dictionary > rogue

Страницы

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